Perils of the High and Low Roads: Employment Relations in the United States and Germany by Turner, Lowell et al.
Cornell University ILR School
DigitalCommons@ILR
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection
2001
Perils of the High and Low Roads: Employment
Relations in the United States and Germany
Lowell Turner
Cornell University, lrt4@cornell.edu
Kirsten S. Wever
Rutgers University
Michael Fichter
Freie Universität, Berlin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, International and Comparative Labor
Relations Commons, and the Unions Commons
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Perils of the High and Low Roads: Employment Relations in the United
States and Germany
Abstract
[Excerpt] The U.S. crisis is characterized by growing income inequality, a shrinking safety net, and the decline
of worker representation. Like the German crisis, it is caused in part by intensified global competition. Unlike
in Germany, problems in the United States have also been exacerbated by deregulation, short-term horizons
(e.g., quarterly reports to shareholders), and the decline of the labor movement.
Both Germany and the United States, however, have substantial political, economic, and social resources to
use in solving their problems. The contemporary crises do not appear for either of these countries to
foreshadow a major collapse like that of the Great Depression. We are confident that actors in Germany and
the United States can and will pursue reforms, including policy innovations and negotiation. In so doing, we
suggest that these societies—the two strongest western economies—have a great deal to learn from each
other and from their common experience in the global economy. They do not need, and are unlikely to get,
convergence. Yet, each could benefit significantly by adopting elements and aspects of the other's institutions,
practices, and policies.
In this chapter, the focus is on employment relations, which we believe are central to the broader economic
and social problems in each society. We consider the following two interrelated questions. First, exactly how
do the internal and external pressures on employment relations emerge in each country? Second, in what
tangible forms do these pressures appear "on the ground," where labor and business (and, more indirectly,
other political, social, and economic actors) interact to perpetuate, alter, or scrap certain modes of production,
including service delivery, work organization, and negotiation?
Keywords
Germany, United States, employment relations, labor movement, reform
Disciplines
Human Resources Management | International and Comparative Labor Relations | Labor Relations | Unions
Comments
Suggested Citation
Turner, L., Wever, K. S. & Fichter, M. (2001). Perils of the high and low roads: Employment relations in the
United States and Germany [Electronic version]. In K. S. Wever (Ed.), Labor, business, and change in Germany
and the United States (pp. 123-155). Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Required Publisher’s Statement
© W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/714
5 
Perils of the High and Low Roads 
Employment Relations in 
the United States and Germany 
Lowell Turner 
Cornell University 
Kirsten Wever 
Rutgers University 
Michael Fichter 
Freie Universitdt, Berlin 
The German economy today finds itself in a crisis of the "high 
road"; by contrast, the U.S. economy is experiencing a parallel crisis of 
the "low road." Although neither of these crises is depression-sized or 
system-threatening, each is domestically perceived as a serious set of 
problems that policymakers have yet to solve. Solutions to each set of 
problems will be guided by understandings of and decisions about the 
viability of, first, alternative institutional frameworks and, second, dif-
ferent forms of production in the contemporary world economy. 
The German high-road crisis is characterized by high unemploy-
ment, continuing painful and uneven development in eastern Germany 
(including east-west conflict within Germany), and new strains 
between unions and employers and between different employer groups 
in a formerly stable social partnership. Important actors in both the 
public and private sector are calling for greatly expanded deregulation 
and a dismantling of the old social partnership, although employers 
remain divided on these issues. This crisis has been intensified by 
international and European competition, internal economic and organi-
zational rigidities, overregulation, high taxes, and certain employers' 
enchantment with the siren songs of deregulation and the low road to 
economic growth. 
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The U.S. crisis is characterized by growing income inequality, a 
shrinking safety net, and the decline of worker representation. Like the 
German crisis, it is caused in part by intensified global competition. 
Unlike in Germany, problems in the United States have also been exac-
erbated by deregulation, short-term horizons (e.g., quarterly reports to 
shareholders), and the decline of the labor movement. 
Both Germany and the United States, however, have substantial 
political, economic, and social resources to use in solving their prob-
lems. The contemporary crises do not appear for either of these coun-
tries to foreshadow a major collapse like that of the Great Depression. 
We are confident that actors in Germany and the United States can and 
will pursue reforms, including policy innovations and negotiation. In 
so doing, we suggest that these societies—the two strongest western 
economies—have a great deal to learn from each other and from their 
common experience in the global economy. They do not need, and are 
unlikely to get, convergence. Yet, each could benefit significantly by 
adopting elements and aspects of the other's institutions, practices, and 
policies. 
In this chapter, the focus is on employment relations, which we 
believe are central to the broader economic and social problems in each 
society. We consider the following two interrelated questions. First, 
exactly how do the internal and external pressures on employment rela-
tions emerge in each country? Second, in what tangible forms do these 
pressures appear "on the ground," where labor and business (and, more 
indirectly, other political, social, and economic actors) interact to per-
petuate, alter, or scrap certain modes of production, including service 
delivery, work organization, and negotiation? 
At the national level of comparison, the strengths and weaknesses 
of the German and U.S. models of employment relations are reversed. 
On the one hand, labor and business in Germany are good at negotiat-
ing adjustments to external and internal pressures at the regional, 
industry, and national levels through extensive and highly articulated 
institutions of employment relations. On the other hand, with some 
notable exceptions, the U.S. legal and political system is relatively ill-
equipped to coordinate employers and unions in reaching consensual 
and encompassing strategies for dealing with the economic and associ-
ated social pressures of competitiveness. 
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At the micro- and meso-levels of analysis, comparative strengths 
and weaknesses are reversed as well. On one hand, U.S. companies 
and unions have developed deep and far-reaching innovations in orga-
nizational structures and processes for labor participation in manage-
ment and industrial relations more generally (Applebaum and Batt 
1994; Rubinstein 1996). Many of these innovations have been dubbed 
international "best practice" and are even the envy of German employ-
ers (Gesamtmetall 1989). On the other hand, at the organizational 
level, German employers are hampered in developing such innovations 
by two key factors: first, the functional rigidity and specialization 
(including management and skill hierarchies) built into most medium-
sized and large companies (Finegold and Keltner, in this volume, p. 55) 
and second, the highly mediated and legally focused function of many 
(but not all) works councils in codetermination at the workplace 
(Wever 1995b). 
The general challenges facing the two countries parallel this mir-
rored comparison. Germany's main challenges in the coming years 
reflect the costs of having taken the high road to competitiveness by 
preserving high wages and skills, high levels of social security, and rel-
ative peace among labor and employer groups while emphasizing 
diversified quality production (Sorge and Streeck 1988), especially in 
its powerful export sectors. But the current high unemployment shows 
that the economic costs of this socially palatable, but in some ways 
decreasingly competitive, national strategy for growth and social peace 
have grown substantially, and they are compounded by the continuing 
high costs of unification. Thus, many German observers, in fact, speak 
of a crisis of the German model (Streeck 1997a,b). 
The chief problems facing the United States, by contrast, arise 
from the prevalence of companies adopting the low road to competi-
tiveness, with its focus on the reduction of labor costs (whether by 
downsizing, deunionizing, moving facilities to domestic or foreign 
nonunion areas, or outsourcing production to nonunion operations). In 
the advanced capitalist countries, along with low wages come low skill 
levels, which in turn are increasingly associated with low quality and 
low productivity. The social inequities that inevitably accompany such 
a strategy (poverty, wide income disparities) have to date seemed 
acceptable, at least to the individual companies choosing to take the 
low road. These growing social problems have, however, become 
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increasingly salient in national and state-level political debates and in 
the lives of millions of U.S. workers and families. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will briefly compare the basic 
institutions and practices of employment relations in the two countries, 
illustrating how in each case these are tightly embedded in broader 
political economic structures, such as financial systems, the organiza-
tion (or disorganization) of the employer community, labor law, and the 
nature of government intervention in employment relations. This is 
followed by a comparison of the past strengths and emerging weak-
nesses of the high- and low-road approaches and a discussion of how 
the problems associated with each path are exacerbated by and 
reflected in the structures and strategies of employment and industrial 
relations. We then illustrate this argument in concrete empirical terms 
by considering how unions, works councils, companies, employer 
associations, and governments at various levels are in fact dealing with 
their respective challenges. Here, we clarify the extent to which varia-
tion in actor strategies can be found even within the two countries. 
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our find-
ings and an argument for what German and U.S. business, labor, and 
government actors and policymakers can learn from each other as they 
try to sort out the unfamiliar problems they face. 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMPARED 
Germany 
The key strength of German employment relations is their inclu-
siveness, which manifests itself in a bias toward negotiating change 
between multiple interested stakeholders (Turner 1998; Soskice 1990; 
Thelen 1991; Wever and Allen 1993; Keim and Unger 1986). Govern-
ment and the labor and employer communities can all be credited with 
upholding critical aspects of the negotiated postwar German model of 
organized modern capitalism.1 The government provides a strong and 
stable institutional infrastructure: framework conditions (Rahmenbe-
dingungen) within which business and labor have found incentives to 
engage in a collaborative relationship from the micro- to the macro-
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level (Allen 1989). The business community takes full advantage of 
the stability offered by a partnership-oriented labor movement and the 
supportive framework offered by the social market economy, promi-
nently including a highly skilled workforce. Sure and steady manage-
ment practices harness worker and manager skills that are based on 
functional specialties and that favor concrete technical skills over gen-
eral managerial qualifications (Berg 1993). The unions actively try to 
influence technological change by promoting high levels of productiv-
ity and skill development (Turner 1991). German unions, for their part, 
have been prepared to modify their wage demands when the overall 
economic good seems to call for such a position. They have allowed 
the works councils (which are formally independent, enterprise-based, 
and legally mandated) to negotiate the terms of changes in human 
resource policies to fit the needs of specific companies (Wever 1994). 
This dynamic remained essentially in place in unified Germany in the 
1990s (Turner 1998). 
More specifically, employment relations in Germany involve sev-
eral interconnected levels of negotiation. Collective bargaining con-
tracts are bargained at the level of the region and industry (e.g., 
between the North Rhine-Westphalian branches of the chemicals 
industry union, Industriegewerkschaft Chemie [IG Chemie], and the 
industry's employer association). In most sectors, patterns are estab-
lished in certain regions roughly coinciding with the German states 
(Lander), which are then adopted in other regions. In some cases, indi-
vidual company agreements set patterns as well: for instance, Volks-
wagen negotiates directly with the metalworkers union IG Metall. 
These bargains cover employers in a range of companies. As such, the 
agreements are perforce highly general, laying out wage, hour, and 
working condition minima. 
These minima are the legal contractual bases used as starting 
points for further negotiations at individual companies, typically 
between a personnel or human resource department and the works 
council. However, even within companies, different interpretations 
and permutations of the collective bargaining agreement may be nego-
tiated: the company works council may reach one set of broad agree-
ments, while works councils at various production or service delivery 
locations may have more refined agreements as well. In many cases, 
the individual works councils may agree on wages that exceed the min-
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ima established by the collective bargaining agreements. In short, the 
works councils effectively translate loose-framework collective bar-
gaining agreements into company- or workplace-specific practices of 
labor-management relations. 
Formally independent of the unions, the councils represent about 
two-thirds to three-quarters of German workers and are most prevalent 
in larger companies. These work councils are in constant contact with 
representatives of personnel or human resources departments, jointly 
implement the collective bargaining agreement, and participate closely 
in most basic personnel decisions. The councils have veto power over 
hiring, firing, transfers, and overtime decisions, among others, and 
must be consulted regarding most other personnel-related matters. 
German managers credit the existence of the councils—that is, man-
agement's ability to negotiate directly with a company- or workplace-
specific body of worker representation—for much of the country's 
vaunted postwar labor peace (Wever 1995b). 
On the subject of labor peace, it is important to note that different 
unions approach negotiations with employer associations differently 
(Markovits 1986). In general, the unions representing metalworkers, 
public employees and employees in the media sector have been 
regarded as fairly forceful and confrontational. However, these 
unions—particularly the huge IG Metall—have made the most 
progress in addressing workers' interests, for instance, on the issue of a 
shortened work week. IG Metall has also been the most strategically 
adept and forward thinking of the German unions, in part because of its 
tremendous resources. The union normally associated with the most 
cooperative tact is IG Chemie, representing workers in the chemicals 
industry.2 Because of the unions' close relationships with the works 
councils, a given union's approach to management usually, but not 
always, reflects that of the works councils within that union's industry. 
Thus, for example, works councils in the chemicals sector tend to be 
fairly quiescent and seldom take the initiative to make organizational 
change within the firm. By contrast, councils in the metalworking 
industry are frequently involved in, and sometimes the initiators of, 
significant work reorganization. 
The overall labor-management relationship in Germany is a con-
structive and cooperative one. In addition to the reasons suggested in 
the previous paragraph, this cooperation can be attributed to the fact 
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that significant dispute resolution procedures take place outside the 
workplace. Disputes are adjudicated by a separate system of labor 
courts, peopled by representatives of labor, business, and government, 
which is widely regarded as fair and effective. 
Suddenly, however, beginning with the breathtaking events that 
started with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and resulted in 
German unification less than a year later, a great deal of uncertainty, a 
host of unfamiliar challenges, a vast economic burden, and an entirely 
new political landscape have been inserted into German employment 
relations, and politics more generally. Germans must now deal simul-
taneously with the new terms of economic and political competition 
that have been introduced by unification; the supplanting of traditional 
forms of production organization; the high cost of German labor; the 
weak international position of the German high-technology sector; and 
the pressures for Germany to conform to the less "social" market stan-
dards of other European Union (EU) countries and of the rest of the 
world (Streeck 1997b; Streeck and Vitols 1994). The German 
employer community—increasingly focused on labor costs—has 
asserted growing unease about the continued viability of further invest-
ments. Germans refer to this problem in shorthand as the Standort 
Deutschland (Germany as a production site) debate. 
In short, the stability, labor peace, "export miracle," and other char-
acteristics of the postwar German political economy have been under-
mined by the pressures of foreign competition, the high cost of 
unification, and the need to cut social spending to meet EU standards 
for Economic and Monetary Union. Under these circumstances, in the 
eyes of employers and of the current Schroder government, the negoti-
ated high-road (high wages, high skill development, high social stan-
dards) strategy has become too costly. One important manifestation of 
German employers' dissatisfaction with the status quo is their falling 
rate of membership in sectoral employer associations, which negotiate 
collective bargains with industry unions. Nonmembership in an 
employer association means a company is not bound to the terms of the 
industry bargain, allowing the company to lower its labor costs. 
Because the centralized foundation of German employment relations 
has long been considered a key to its postwar socioeconomic success, 
the weakening of these institutions is clearly cause for concern to labor 
(Silvia 1997). 
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Two other significant challenges threaten traditional German 
employment relations. First, institutional, organizational, and strategic 
rigidities limit the substance of what can be negotiated among the 
major actors, especially in comparison to "best practice" cases in the 
United States. German managers have been deeply but, in comparative 
terms, narrowly trained for functionally specialized deployment (Lane 
1989; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986). Thus, German manage-
ment faces peculiar problems in developing the cross-functionality and 
flexible new forms of organization that are necessary to compete in the 
contemporary international marketplace (see also Finegold and Keltner 
in this volume, p. 55). 
The second challenge in adopting less rigid forms of work and pro-
duction organization lies in the structure and functions of the works 
councils as laid out by the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (as 
amended). The councils exist as a buffer between workers and person-
nel or human resource management departments. They seldom con-
duct substantive negotiations with operations managers or workplace-
level supervisors; needless to say, in most cases, neither do frontline 
workers. Most of the councils' functions concern managing human 
resources, not enhancing labor participation in decision making at the 
point of production. 
The United States 
The key strength of U.S. employment relations is the relative 
weakness of institutional constraints on the parties involved. This free-
dom makes possible world-class innovations in work and production 
organization, training initiatives, service delivery mechanisms, team-
work, and cross-functional collaboration, as well as a capacity for 
organizational innovation of all kinds. 
As in Germany, the government has created an institutional frame-
work to govern employment relations. That framework consists of two 
main pieces: first, the National Labor Relations Act (commonly known 
as the Wagner Act), the Railway Labor Act, and parallel public sector 
legislation, which govern union-management relations and union 
structure in the unionized sector of the economy; and second, the pro-
liferation of laws governing individual employee rights (regarding, for 
instance, Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] and affirmative 
Employment Relations 131 
action). These rights are cumbersome for the employer because they 
can end in lawsuits and significant financial penalties and because they 
can be filed by either individual employees or groups of employees. 
Nevertheless, most medium-sized and large companies are benignly 
inclined toward EEO and affirmative action. In contrast, U.S. employ-
ers have historically objected ardently to collective employee and 
union rights as codified in the Wagner Act and other legislation. 
Today, the rules of union organizing, union recognition, collective 
bargaining, contract administration (grievance procedures), strikes, and 
lockouts—which were established by the New Deal framework (cen-
tering on the Wagner Act)—are hotly contested by many employers 
(Babson 1995). Many, perhaps most, U.S. firms are run by managers 
who believe that unionization necessarily entails significant increases 
in labor costs without any balancing improvements in company com-
petitiveness such as the higher levels of productivity and quality that 
have been shown in Germany (Milkman 1997). Moreover, like much 
of the public at large, many managers associate U.S. unions with con-
tentious and combative labor relations, long and bitter strikes, and a 
hostile work climate. Unions' legislative efforts to make it illegal for 
companies to hire permanent replacement workers in case of a strike 
have been bitterly and successfully fought by the employer community 
and their conservative (Democratic as well as Republican) allies in 
Congress. Indeed, even the extremely mild labor law reform that was 
introduced in 1978 under the Democratic Administration of Jimmy 
Carter, to ease the rules connected with organizing new workers, failed 
to pass into law. 
Outside the legislative arena, companies have used multiple legal 
and illegal means to prevent their employees from unionizing. Many 
companies with some union operations have shifted production toward 
nonunion operations, often in more conservative regions of the country, 
where states' right-to-work laws constrain union rights. Union decerti-
fication campaigns have grown in number and have been increasingly 
successful since the early 1980s. Partly as a result, union density (the 
percentage of the workforce that is unionized) has dropped from 
almost 25 percent in the late 1970s to less than 14 percent currently. 
This drop has occurred despite continuing relative union gains in the 
public sector. Private sector unionism has dropped to less than 10 per-
cent. 
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The U.S. union movement has been under constant and effective 
attack by these forces for more than two decades, which is one impor-
tant reason why unions are often unwilling to engage in cooperative 
endeavors with employers. The overall weakness of organized labor in 
the United States is not the only impediment to joint labor-manage-
ment innovations. Another important factor is the law itself. The Wag-
ner Act lays out in detailed terms precisely how unions can organize, 
what issues they may bargain over, and what sorts of structures must 
attach to any joint labor-management efforts. Thus, for example, 
many impressive examples of union initiatives in organizing and labor-
management innovations, strictly speaking, may violate U.S. labor 
law.3 
Unlike in Germany, collective bargaining in the United States is 
conducted for the most part at the company level (often supplemented 
by plant-level agreements). Variation across union contracts is great, 
and contracts are in general lengthy, highly specific, and arduous to 
negotiate. Although some of the more powerful unions in some ways 
resemble German-style industry unions, there are many examples of 
conflict among unions over the right to represent particular groups of 
workers.4 Given the diversity of U.S. negotiation strategies, the exist-
ence of over a hundred different unions (craft and industrial unions as 
well as some hybrids), and the lack of coordination among employers 
in standardizing employment relations (bargaining minima or max-
ima), the United States cannot benefit from the channels of communi-
cation and bargaining alternatives that are available to German unions, 
works councils, and employers. 
Having no "second channel" of worker representation (such as the 
works council), unions in the United States typically have no influence 
over the kinds of human resource management decisions that require 
the input of works councils in Germany and most other advanced 
industrial countries. In most cases, therefore, the adage that "manage-
ment acts, the union reacts" continues to hold true. In addition to stra-
tegic considerations based on widespread management hostility toward 
unions, this lack of a second channel is another way in which U.S. 
unions are discouraged from taking an active role in labor-manage-
ment or organizational innovations. Moreover, lacking a separate 
forum for dispute resolution (such as the German Labor Courts), the 
tensions accompanying labor disputes are played out in the same arena 
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in which contracts are negotiated and administered. This combination 
introduces a potentially hostile mood and distributive considerations 
into the very forum in which joint labor-management endeavors could 
hypothetically be developed. Given this combative institutional and 
cultural landscape, it is no wonder that strike rates are much higher in 
the United States than in Germany. 
Under these circumstances, it is noteworthy—if not astonishing— 
that in some cases that are discussed in the following section, unions, 
workers, and managers have jointly developed highly refined methods 
for changing the nature of labor-management relations and the organi-
zation of work and production. In part, their ability to buck the trend 
rests on the fact that while the government's intervention in labor rela-
tions is detailed and intensive on paper, it is relatively minimal in fact. 
Examples of labor-management participation and cooperation leading 
to significant organizational and relational innovations have seldom 
been challenged legally. 
Successful U.S. cases of the transformation of traditional labor-
management relations (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) can partly 
be attributed to the lack of organizational and strategic rigidities that in 
Germany limit the substance of what can be negotiated. Even the Ger-
man-based operations of many U.S.-owned companies appear to be 
characterized by the kinds of cross-functional, flexible new forms of 
employment relations and work and production organization that are 
necessary to competitiveness in the contemporary international market-
place but so difficult to engender in the German context (Wever 
1995a). 
Finally, U.S. innovations are in some ways aided by the lack of 
German-style works councils: where joint innovations are negotiated 
and implemented, unions and workers typically negotiate intensively 
and regularly with operations managers and production supervisors, 
rather than being limited to formal relations with the personnel or 
human resources function. Rather than acting as a buffer between 
workers and management in these cases, unions act as facilitators in 
ongoing negotiations with management about how work is best accom-
plished. 
In short, the employment relations systems and environments of 
the United States and Germany are strikingly different, each with its 
peculiar strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the U.S. system, 
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at the level of organizational innovation, are mirrored in reverse by the 
weaknesses of the German system, while German strengths in institu-
tional supports for extensive dialogue and negotiations between labor 
and management are the reverse image of the great tensions between 
the parties in U.S. labor relations. 
A COMPARISON 
How can these problems in U.S. and German employment rela-
tions systems be categorized, and what are the implications of the com-
parison? After several decades of pursuing the unilateral managerial 
(United States) and negotiated (German) paths, each country now faces 
a path-specific set of problems. 
The German high road entails what Streeck (1992) has dubbed a 
"virtuous circle," in which the production of high labor-value-added, 
high-quality goods, requiring a skilled and cooperative core workforce, 
promotes exports. These qualities in turn have reinforced the "diversi-
fied quality production mode," relying on broad, long-term consensus 
among the social partners. This is the sort of consensus that has histor-
ically led German unions to forfeit wage gains in times of recession, in 
the knowledge that they would be recouped in boom times. 
The U.S. low road, by contrast, entails efforts to substitute technol-
ogy for labor, to cut labor costs where possible, with the inevitable 
resistance and—given employers' power in the United States—even-
tual weakening of organized labor. Another low-road strategy is to 
move operations to geographical locations (foreign or domestic) where 
labor costs are lower by virtue of the weakness of or lack of unions or 
low prevailing wages. Relatively high labor costs and the need to pro-
duce high labor-value-added goods and services persist in many indus-
tries (e.g., high-tech services, some areas of high-tech manufacturing, 
and most business services). But in the United States, even in indus-
tries in which a high road is possible (e.g., in telecommunications, 
where service quality is critical to productivity and profits), we see 
firms not only pursuing the high road (e.g., BellSouth, at least until 
1994) but also building a lower labor cost, nonunion model without 
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labor participation in management and with less concern for skill 
development (Batt and Darbishire, in this volume, p. 17). 
Germany 
In Germany, as suggested in the previous section, institutions and 
the traditions they have spawned are necessarily associated with slow, 
thorough, widely negotiated, and usually more or less consensual 
change. The notoriously slow pace of organizational decision making 
is lamented by German managers, as are Germany's high labor costs. 
The problem is that to speed change would require the relaxation of 
regulations, which in turn would require significant adjustments to the 
current institutional framework of employment relations. Such adjust-
ments would lead (indeed, have led) to noticeable increases in social 
unrest. Public sector strikes in the 1990s in Germany surrounding the 
government's efforts to cut the social wage attest to this. For employ-
ers, simply to move in the direction of the low road, even with the tacit 
support of powerful forces in the federal government, would be to 
court levels of social strife (e.g., conflicts, strikes, slowdowns, or sick-
outs) which might require the sacrifice of both labor peace and the high 
level of overall skills. 
Germany's endangered position on the high road both influences 
and is influenced by German employment relations. The effect on 
labor relations is perhaps more obvious. Employers and their associa- , 
tions have been calling for lower labor costs for at least 20 years. To 
the extent that employers choose not to join or to drop out of employer 
associations, it is usually because they wish to avoid the terms and con-
ditions of sectoral contracts. 
But the structure of employment relations also contributes to the 
problem. To the extent that unions are unwilling to allow more sub-
stantive issues to be negotiated at the local level between individual 
companies and works councils, employers will continue to find at least 
some public and political support for their efforts to lessen the influ-
ence of the collective representatives of employees. 
It should be noted that IG Metall and IG Chemie, as well as several 
other unions, are on the record as being willing to renegotiate the struc-
ture of collective bargaining and the relationship between industry-
wide and company-specific issues and dynamics. Indeed, IG Metall 
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publicized proposals on this topic as early as 1990 (IG Metall 1990). 
Nevertheless, the positions of the unions and the employer associations 
remain distant from each other, especially in the pattern-setting metal 
industries. In part, this is because the unions are, not surprisingly, loath 
to give up too much centralized control over the terms and conditions 
of employment. The rift between labor and management can also be 
attributed in part to some employers' near-total embrace of the United 
States' more unilateral approach to labor-management relations, 
which reduces labor's participatory powers far more than the unions, 
most works councils, or German society as a whole accept. 
Many employers try to create worker participation and worker-
management cooperation programs that bypass the councils and the 
unions, with mixed success. Again, this tactic resembles the more uni-
lateral managerial approach associated with employment relations in 
the United States. In this regard, given the need for strong labor repre-
sentatives in order to preserve the noted benefits of the German system, 
such methods exemplify how the structure of employment relations not 
only contributes to, but also clearly reflects, Germany's high-road 
problem. 
The United States 
In the United States too, the employment relations system—along 
with other features of the institutional landscape, such as employer 
organization (Casper, in this volume, p. 93)—helps create the problem 
as well as being directly affected by it. The contentious nature of 
union-management relations in most of the unionized sectors makes it 
reasonable for many employers to try to weaken unions or seek non-
union settings in which to produce their goods and services. The so-
called "union wage premium"—the wage benefit enjoyed by union 
workers as compared with workers in similar jobs who are not union-
ized (currently between 25 and 30 percent of wages)—is also part of 
the problem from the standpoint of employers.5 Union work rules his-
torically have hampered employers in their efforts to deploy workers 
efficiently. For instance, craft workers maintain narrow jurisdictional 
lines, meaning that a plumber on site may be prohibited by the labor 
contract from changing a light bulb if electricians are otherwise occu-
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pied or not available. This is another reason why many employers 
dread unions. 
The U.S. employment relations system also lacks institutional 
structures that offer employees pride in their negotiation skills and in 
implementing workplace transformation initiatives. Ever since the rise 
of the industrial unions in the 1930s, the emphasis of many unions has 
been more on the organization of existing workforces, skilled and 
unskilled. The skills of those workers and the improvement of their 
skills have seemed less important to the unions than simply consolidat-
ing the labor movement sufficiently to gain significant bargaining 
power vis-a-vis individual employers. To the extent that skill develop-
ment has played an important role, programs have been fostered and 
often delivered primarily by craft unions, which have strong interests in 
preserving their jurisdictional lines (in competition with other unions) 
and maintaining control over the content of skills (e.g., hampering 
efforts to broaden skills in line with more flexible work practices). 
There is much to applaud in the revitalization of the labor movement 
that followed the 1995 election of a dynamic labor leader, John 
Sweeney, to the presidency of the American Federation of Labor-Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Sweeney has reorga-
nized the federation and hired an intelligent, young, and dynamic new 
top staff. Nevertheless, the main priorities of the new AFL-CIO are 
similar to those of the industrial unions in the 1930s, which focused 
more on organizing new members than on improving and protecting 
skills. Moreover, union density declined again in the year 2000, and 
organizing efforts are waning in many unions. 
Employment relations also takes its toll on the U.S. institutional 
landscape. Most obviously, employers' sustained attack on the labor 
movement (including decertifications and the legal and widespread 
practice of firing pro-union employees) has created a climate in which 
any union cooperation with management is by itself a remarkable 
accomplishment. Moreover, because a union can be decertified or a 
plant's operations moved to a nonunion setting or even abroad, most 
joint labor-management programs exist de facto at the sufferance of 
management. There are in fact numerous cases in which employers 
have suddenly and/or arbitrarily terminated apparently successful and 
far-reaching participatory experiments.6 
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Another important way in which the U.S. institutional framework 
contributes to the low-road problem stems from the pressures created 
by its financial system. Most U.S. companies view stockholders as 
their primary stakeholders. Stockholders and lenders require quarterly 
statements of profits and losses. Many managers' salaries are tied to 
financial performance on a quarterly basis. This system creates a host 
of incentives to develop short-term business strategies. However, 
investments in human capital, to say nothing of investments in efforts 
to transform the labor-management relationship, offer only long-term 
returns. Moreover, since they are in many regards qualitative, these 
"returns" are hard to measure. In many cases, it cannot be shown 
quantitatively that productivity or quality improvements follow from 
these kinds of investments. Many managers could argue, in fact, that 
such improvements would have occurred even in the absence of train-
ing or labor-management participation programs. 
What, then, would indicate that significant inroads into solving the 
low-road crisis were being made? We argue that at the very least, sig-
nificant changes to current U.S. labor law would be needed. In addi-
tion, changes to the financial system and to other features of the 
institutional landscape (such as antitrust laws, which limit extensive 
employer coordination of the sort that is possible in Germany) could 
improve the situation. 
The high- and low-road crises of Germany and the United States 
can be understood in terms of the mirrored reversals that we explained 
earlier: the U.S. context is better suited to promoting organizational 
innovation and change (albeit usually without the involvement of col-
lective worker representation), while the German context better coordi-
nates the main actors, such that change is negotiated and consensual 
(albeit slow). 
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 
In this section, we examine the main priorities and current action 
plans of the parties on the ground in both countries, focusing on how 
they might be helping to solve the problems we have covered in this 
chapter. 
Employment Relations 139 
Germany: Renegotiating the Negotiated System 
In contrast to that in the United States, employment in Germany is 
characterized by high and relatively egalitarian average wages and 
partnership relations in firms and workplaces that largely reflect a high-
road philosophy (Streeck 1997b). The question of how to create alter-
native strategies for reform from those available to labor and manage-
ment is central to the future of the Germany's well-structured, 
integrated, and interdependent socioeconomic system. The debate over 
which strategies to use raises the question of whether all or at least 
some basic elements of the system should be reformed or whether sin-
gle, company-oriented proposals should be advanced. Discussions 
among the various sectors of the economy and within unions and 
employer organizations have produced conflicting opinions on how to 
best solve these problems. 
The two key problems concern the instrument of comprehensive 
sectoral collective agreements and the role of works councils and co-
determination. Sectoral collective agreements set wage minima and 
define the spectrum of company-level bargaining over work organiza-
tion. Critics regard this system as too inflexible and cumbersome to 
function effectively. Indeed, the highly structured character of the Ger-
man system and the overall strength of the unions and the employer 
associations have been maintained despite membership losses on both 
sides and numerous steps toward decentralization. Many negotiated 
agreements are moving toward more decentralization, including, for 
instance, recommendations by the sectoral bargaining agents for com-
pany-level negotiations on a variety of topics (Bahnmuller and 
Bispinck 1995, p. 157). The breadth of topics that can be negotiated at 
the company level has grown, especially in regard to the flexibility of 
working hours. For example, in 1994, the employer association Ge-
samtmetall and IG Metall signed a contract allowing management and 
works councils to negotiate agreements that reduce working hours even 
though these hours may deviate from the general provisions of the sec-
toral contract. 
It is still common practice for employer associations and trade 
unions to reach pragmatic compromises that exemplify the negotiated 
workings of the system. Nevertheless, the employer associations have 
been uneasy with the centralized system and have offered proposals for 
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revamping it. Probably the most widespread of these is the demand for 
including "opening clauses" (Offnungsklauseln) in sectoral agree-
ments. These clauses explicitly empower management to bargain with 
their works councils over the replacement, modification, or extension 
of sectoral contract provisions (Gesamtmetall 1996). Some form of 
"opening clause" is now included in many contracts. The chemical 
industry employer association was among the first to negotiate opening 
clauses with IG Chemie in reaction to "intensified international pres-
sure on costs" (BAVC 1996). 
Over the past few years, all members of the union federation 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [DGB]) have proposed revisions to the 
coordinated bargaining system. Although many unions are still wary 
of employer reform ambitions, the door to reaching a negotiated reform 
remains open. Sectoral and regional contracts negotiated by IG Metall 
and Gesamtmetall for 1997-1998, for instance, call the sectoral collec-
tive agreement "a sound instrument, open to the future, for regulating 
industrial relations . . . offering . . . sufficient room for tailored solu-
tions to specific company problems" (Hiisson 1997, p. 5). Most union 
leaders recognize the need to make revisions that reflect the enormous 
structural changes in the economy. Membership drops in the employer 
associations support this view because unions depend on employer 
associations as representative bargaining partners. 
The position of the DGB unions is reflected in a policy statement 
passed at an extraordinary congress of the DGB in November 1996. 
Seeing the need to "recognize the differentiated interests of employ-
ees" and contribute to "shaping the different realities of individual 
branches and enterprises," the unions called for the introduction of 
"packaged options" into the sectoral contract (Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund 1996, p. 14). For example, in the chemical industry, the 
social partners have made a point of promoting company-level agree-
ments that are embedded in the structures of sectoral collective bar-
gaining (Terbrack 1997, p. 7). Agreements reached in 1996-1997 in 
the metalworking and electrical industries provide standard options for 
regulating the relationship between bonus pay and absenteeism (Ar-
beitsstelle Nationale und Internationale Gewerkschaftspolitik 1997). 
The unions remain basically opposed to relinquishing their negoti-
ating rights to company or workplace agents. Not only do they shy 
away from potentially chaotic conditions, which could be the result of 
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blanket deregulation, but they also fear for their own organizational 
stability. Although the German unions have fared well in comparison 
with many unions in other industrialized countries, they too have been 
plagued by organizational problems and membership flight (Fichter 
1997). Employer associations suffer from many of the same problems. 
Mid-sized and small enterprises especially have become highly critical 
of the wage negotiation policies of their associations, calling for more 
resistance to union demands. In many instances, dissatisfaction has 
grown to the point that withdrawing from employer associations has 
become an increasingly popular strategic alternative, and newly estab-
lished enterprises are refraining from joining at all. This conflict of 
interests is particularly evident in the large Gesamtmetall,7 but is of no 
less concern to a number of other associations, for example, those in 
the pharmaceutical industry (Schnabel 1995, p. 59). 
The burden on local management and works councils to find com-
pany-specific solutions to the complex issues of jobless growth and 
employment insecurity has grown. Works councils are under pressure 
to assent to extensive cuts, which sometimes break from binding sec-
toral contracts (as is often tacitly acknowledged by employer associa-
tions) to avoid membership losses. Below the level of contract 
stipulations we find, as Streeck (1996, p. 91) noted, "coalitions 
between employers, who want to lower their wage and possibly their 
training costs, and employees, who prefer lower pay to no pay at all." 
Efforts by the unions to stem this tide and combat rising unemploy-
ment have been unsuccessful. In January 1994, IG Chemie signed a 
two-year contract allowing firms to hire new workers at 95 percent of 
the contract rate for the first year of employment. However, if a person 
is hired who has been unemployed for 6 months or for at least 12 
months within a 24-month period prior to being hired, then pay would 
be at 90 percent of contract wages for the first year. Such employees 
would have only "temporary" status. Similar plans exist in eastern 
Germany, where special government regulations forced the unions into 
such agreements. IG Chemie decided on its own to pursue this path in 
western Germany, hoping to create employment. However, recent sur-
veys suggest this has not happened. The union is now negotiating with 
the employer association over the introduction of lower pay rates in 
selected segments of the chemical industry such as plastics and syn-
thetic fibers. 
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In late 1995, Klaus Zwickel, head of IG Metall, presented a three-
year plan called an "Alliance for Jobs" (Bundnis fiir Arbeit), in which 
the union offered to forgo real wage increases if employers would 
agree to create 300,000 new jobs. This was an attempt to build on the 
Volkswagen model, a highly respected 1994 agreement that saved 
some 30,000 jobs by reducing the average number of weekly hours to 
27.5 (Hartz 1994; Volkswagen AG and IG Metall 1994). The Kohl 
government tried to get substantive tripartite negotiations started on the 
basis of Zwickel's proposal. The employer associations ultimately 
demurred on the grounds that the prerogative for job creation lay with 
individual employers. Instead, they proposed company-level job alli-
ances. These, however, turned into something quite different from 
what IG Metall intended (Zeuner 1996): rather than giving up pay 
increases to create new jobs, works councils found themselves negoti-
ating pay cuts (within the limits of sectoral contracts) to secure existing 
employment and prevent further dismissals (Rosdiicher and Stehle 
1996, p. 325). A full-scale national Alliance for Jobs would have to 
wait for the election of a Red-Green government in 1998. Although 
already an important forum, tripartite Alliance negotiations remain dif-
ficult and often quite adversarial. 
Codetermination and works councils have contributed to establish-
ing a climate of negotiation and compromise that has long had a posi-
tive effect on the stability and adjustment capacity of the German 
economy (Bacon, Blyton, and Morris 1996). In the past decade, how-
ever, the scope and complexity of issues bargained at the enterprise 
level have increased tremendously. Even those who champion the 
instruments of workplace negotiations wonder how these negotiations 
can deal with the problems of job loss, outsourcing, and the increasing 
mobility of capital and labor (Dieterich 1997, p. 3). Creating new pat-
terns of work organization and introducing concepts of group and indi-
vidual responsibility raises new issues that the existing channels of 
employer, worker, and union representation must learn to handle 
(Miiller-Jentsch and Sperling 1995, p. 42; see also Baethge and Wolf 
1995, p. 243). 
Employment relations in eastern Germany since 1990 can be 
understood largely as a battle on the part of German unions and large 
employers to defend the high road for unified Germany. Unions and 
employer associations from the west moved into the collapsing east 
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beginning in 1990 to establish comprehensive collective bargaining. 
When employers backed down on their wage parity commitment in 
1993, eastern workers, led by IG Metall, waged an extraordinarily suc-
cessful strike to defend rising wages along the high road (Turner 1998). 
Management-led innovations in the east have also furthered high-
road potential for unified Germany. Western managers, for example, 
soon discovered that modern forms of shop-floor and office teamwork 
could be introduced on the basis of socialist brigade legacies more eas-
ily and with less resistance than in the established west. Eastern plants, 
such as VW in Mosel and Opel in Eisenach, have become pattern set-
ters, not only for modernization in the east but also for work reorgani-
zation in the west. 
Finally, the European Union (EU) contains a variety of systems of 
employment relations. Analysts argue about whether the weakness of 
Europe-wide social regulations may lead to the eventual dismantling of 
the existing structures of codetermination and works councils (cf. 
Streeck 1997b; Turner 1998). 
The United States: Isolated High-Road Struggles 
in a Low-Road Context 
Employment relations in the United States are characterized above 
all by numerous approaches and relationships, both traditional and 
innovative. The traditional approach, as influenced by the concept of 
"scientific management," viewed employees to a large extent as 
replaceable parts that could perform as directed. As an outcome, the 
assembly line revolutionized production in the United States, and fac-
tory-developed approaches to personnel management spread widely 
throughout the economy in both the private and public sectors. In reac-
tion, in the 1930s, industrial unions grew and engaged in damage con-
trol, establishing rules and workplace rights and improving wages and 
benefits. Although there were exceptions as well as considerable varia-
tion, employee relations in the twentieth century to a large extent con-
tinue to be largely adversarial. 
In spite of many famous cases of innovation and countless quality 
and employee involvement programs, the U.S. workplace remains sig-
nificantly hierarchical and authoritarian (Babson 1995; Milkman 
1997). Adversarialism is more muted in nonunion workplaces, 
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although the decline of the labor movement has opened up a represen-
tation gap by removing the possibility of a meaningful, independent 
voice in the workplace for many employees (Freeman and Rogers 
1995). 
Nonetheless, both successful and failed innovation has been wide-
spread since the 1970s as changing world markets have highlighted the 
value of active employee participation. In notable cases, unionized 
workplaces have been transformed from conditions of "armed truce" to 
showplaces of employee participation and labor-management collabo-
ration. The auto industry, for example (the traditional model in adver-
sarial labor-management relations), has set new standards of 
excellence and provided new patterns for emulation. In 1984, an old, 
highly adversarial General Motors (GM) plant in California reopened 
as NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated, a GM-
Toyota joint venture), demonstrating a reformed management approach 
oriented toward shop-floor teamwork and active union participation in 
decision-making processes. These changes showed the potential for 
transforming the U.S. workplace, with its experienced workforce, into 
a more productive and less conflictual environment (Brown and Reich 
1989; Turner 1991). NUMMI provided Toyota's now-famous "lean 
production" model, which quickly succeeded in proving the value of a 
new team structure with enhanced training and input from employees. 
The dark side of lean production also became clear at NUMMI, as 
employees complained about intense production pressure and only 
very narrow participation opportunities—such as brainstorming how to 
bring a 60-second work cycle down to 58 seconds (Turner 1991; Bab-
son 1995). 
The highly successful Saturn experiment in Tennessee took United 
Autoworkers-General Motors (UAW-GM) collaboration several steps 
further (Rubinstein 1996). Like NUMMI, this case is widely known 
and intensively studied, and certain lessons stand out in sharp relief. 
First, profound change is possible within the loose framework of 
employment relations in the United States. Second, close company-
union collaboration from the very start can foster quality-enhancing 
information flows, consensual decision making, and active participa-
tion and commitment all around. Third, extensive labor participation 
can lead directly to pathbreaking innovation in production organiza-
tion, from design through sales and service. However, the failure of the 
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Saturn model to spread to other settings reflects continuing organiza-
tional inertia at both GM and UAW and continuing ambivalence about 
making high-road investments in a low-road economy (Wever, Batt, 
and Rubinstein 1996). 
Beyond the auto industry, there are numerous other successful 
cases of labor-management partnership at unionized workplaces. 
These include AT&T, NYNEX, BellSouth, Xerox, Corning, United 
Airlines, and others. Two recent examples in very different industries 
offer tantalizing models for future agreements elsewhere. Levi-Strauss 
and UNITE (the apparel and textile workers union) agreed in the early 
1990s to a broad framework agreement that incorporated union offi-
cials into decision-making processes throughout the organization. It 
pledged the company not to oppose union organizing campaigns at 
nonunion Levi-Strauss plants. Kaiser Permanente (a large, HMO-ori-
ented healthcare and hospital organization), after extensive negotia-
tions with its 14 unions, agreed in 1997 to a similar deal. This 
agreement included a provision applying to Kaiser's 30,000 nonunion 
employees (out of a total workforce of 80,000). The company agreed 
to recognize a new union as soon as 51 percent of eligible employees at 
a given Kaiser workplace signed cards indicating their desire to union-
ize. This breakthrough (known as card-check recognition) eliminated 
the need for the bitter election campaigns that are usually necessary to 
create a union in a nonunion workplace and that, win or lose, so often 
leave an enduring legacy of hostility and adversarial relations. Each of 
these cases can be understood in part as an attempt by companies and 
unions to shift from a low-road to a high-road orientation. 
Numerous innovations in employment relations also exist at non-
union workplaces, many of which serve explicitly or implicitly to keep 
unions out. In the auto industry, so-called Japanese transplants (Toyota 
in Kentucky, Nissan in Tennessee, and Honda in Ohio) run high-pro-
ductivity, lean-production operations similar to NUMMI but without 
union representation. Motorola and Hewlett-Packard are widely cited 
examples of nonunion high-road approaches that emphasize good 
working conditions, decent pay and benefits (relative to comparable 
pay in a given geographical area), mechanisms for limited employee 
voice, and a strong focus on skill development and employee training. 
More common in nonunion workplaces is the low road. This 
reflects an enduring tradition, dating back to the beginnings of industri-
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alization, of authoritarian management that is focused on controlling 
workers and holding down wages. These, of course, are the very cir-
cumstances in which unions emerged as workers' champions in the 
1930s, but the long decline of the U.S. labor movement has permitted 
the continuation and expansion of this hierarchical and/or paternalistic 
trend. Examples range from apparel sweatshops in New York City to 
poultry processing plants across the South and Japanese-owned manu-
facturing plants, with the auto assembly plants standing out as rare 
exceptions to the low-road approach (Milkman 1995). Even as firms 
modernize their production organizations both domestically and 
through cross-national networks, low-road problems of labor sweating 
and income inequality continue to persist and in many cases intensify 
(Harrison 1994). 
Low-road production persists in the United States largely because 
there are so few obstacles or disincentives to low-road practices (such 
as low wages and benefits, intensified pressure on the workforce, and 
minimal skills development). Positive incentives for high-road invest-
ment, such as adequate government support and regional labor-man-
agement partnerships for vocational training, are rare. These are the 
incentives one finds in Germany and in pathbreaking U.S. cases such as 
the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (Parker 1997). 
The current revival of the U.S. labor movement could encourage 
more labor-management partnerships and is the most hopeful sign of a 
possible solution to the U.S. low-road crisis. New labor leaders and 
activists at the AFL-CIO, as well as at some of its member unions, are 
pouring increased resources into organizing campaigns and developing 
innovative strategies to reach low-wage workers. In the meantime, 
some unions are encouraging labor-management partnerships at indi-
vidual companies and in regional skills programs as part of a proposed 
broad union-employer "social compact" (Greenhouse 1996). 
Although this current revival is in its infancy and may or may not suc-
ceed in the long run, the prospects appear more hopeful than at any 
time over the past 20 years (Turner, Katz, and Hurd 2001). The experi-
ence of numerous high-road countries in northern Europe demonstrates 
that, in the interest of economy-wide domestic or export-oriented high-
road production, it is essential to close off low-road options. One obvi-
ous way to do this is through comprehensive collective bargaining cov-
erage. 
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In sum, the United States can boast important high-road innova-
tions and partnerships at particular companies and in certain areas. Yet 
such innovations continue to occur within a low-road context. Because 
employers in the United States are relatively unconstrained and face 
broad choices in strategic planning, they can make high-road choices 
while simultaneously continuing on the path of least resistance toward 
new or continuing low-road production strategies. Serious income 
polarization and a generally weak skills base (Reich 1991; Harrison 
1994) suggest that the low road occupies an all-too-large, if not a pre-
dominant, position in the U.S. economy. Incentives necessary to pro-
mote the high road include expanded government participation and 
legislation; employer and labor support, including joint efforts to pro-
mote skills training; and more labor-management partnerships like 
those at Saturn, Levi-Strauss, and Kaiser-Permanente, as well as the 
continued expansion of union organizing efforts. 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MUTUAL LEARNING 
What can the United States and Germany learn from each other 
regarding necessary reforms to contemporary employment relations in 
each country? Because their institutional contexts are so different, we 
do not believe that employment relations in these two countries will 
converge. But we do believe that the key actors, including policymak-
ers in each country, have much to learn from the experiences of the 
other. 
It is clear that German employers, as well as unions, feel increas-
ingly intense pressure to decentralize the coordinated sectoral and 
regional bargaining system that has been credited with much of their 
post-war economic miracle. Perhaps the most important lesson for 
German unions, works councils, and employers and employer associa-
tions is the old saying, "Don't throw the baby out with the bath water." 
The baby represents what still works well in the German system, 
including the institutional mechanisms that can help negotiate success-
ful methods for addressing new and unfamiliar economic pressures 
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(international pressures as well as those stemming from unification and 
membership in the EU). 
Most Germans are aware of the most extreme dangers of U.S.-style 
"cowboy capitalism" such as the low-road problems we have explored 
in this chapter. If significant deregulation and decentralization are ini-
tiated, the unions and employer associations would be enfeebled and 
might end up with more U.S.-style problems, including significant 
social problems (from poverty and crime to the rise of neo-Naziism). 
One would hope that the unions remain strong enough and retain 
enough overall social legitimacy that they could prevent such develop-
ments from going too far. Germany cannot afford to take a path which 
might result in social turmoil or in undermining the negotiating climate 
which characterizes the German political economy; either would be an 
economically costly outcome. 
A second important lesson for Germany is that truly flexible work-
place innovation can be compatible with high-road institutional struc-
tures. As noted above, the low-road context, within which stunning 
organizational innovations occur even in unionized settings, is far from 
supportive of high-road innovations. It is, in fact, an impediment. The 
low-road context of U.S. industry has isolated the Saturn innovations 
and now threatens to undermine completely BellSouth's labor-man-
agement innovations (see Batt and Darbishire, in this volume, p. 17). 
In fact, if a larger portion of the U.S. economy were characterized by 
high-road practices (union coverage, high wages, skills development, 
and proactive labor-management partnership), locally developed inno-
vations would likely be easier to implement and transfer to other set-
tings. 
However, this is not to say that there are no features of the German 
system of employment relations that might impede such innovations. 
On the contrary, as noted earlier, possible impediments to innovation 
can be found in the formal nature of relations between works councils 
and personnel or human resource departments, in the relatively rare 
occurrence of direct worker participation in decision making at the 
point of production (see also Wever 1995b), and in the functionally 
specialized and rigid aspects of organizational structures and manage-
ment strategies (see Finegold and Keltner, in this volume, p. 55). In 
other words, to emulate U.S.-style innovations, Germans would need to 
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retain and restructure appropriate institutional supports without cling-
ing to institutional constraints associated with the German model. 
U.S. policymakers and practitioners can learn from Germany's 
experience that the benefits of an economy-wide high-road approach 
cannot be achieved in a totally independent, company-by-company 
employment relations setting. To move toward a higher road in the 
United States, employers must create forums for collective information 
sharing, standard setting, and possibly even resource pooling. The 
Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, mentioned earlier, represents 
a rare example of regional efforts in this direction (Parker 1997; Parker 
and Rogers 2001). Similar, less developed efforts in this direction are 
under way in the states of California, New Jersey, and Washington. 
These regional development projects illustrate that institutions can be 
created to support mutually beneficial outcomes without entailing 
unacceptable institutional constraints on individual employers or 
unions. 
This lesson is reinforced by the fact that Germany's efforts at imi-
tating low-road practices—in the rare cases where this has been possi-
ble—are not working. For instance, employer-based agreements in the 
chemicals sector for trading off job creation against wage or hour con-
cessions have often resulted in wage concessions in exchange for mere 
employment security, not job creation. 
Finally, it can hardly be a coincidence that growing domestic, 
social, and economic problems in the United States coincide with the 
erosion of the national skills base. As unions have lost power, wages 
and benefits have stagnated, and skills have followed closely behind. 
Absent the capacity of governments, companies, or employees to pay 
for skills development, educational and training institutions have not 
been able to slow the low-road descent. Low-road jobs have swelled 
the ranks of the "working poor," who must now compete with former 
welfare recipients in transition from welfare to low-paying jobs. This 
inevitably will continue to lead to increased homelessness, ill health 
(absent national health care), and other social problems. As these prob-
lems mount, employers will be less and less interested in hiring from 
this large segment of the workforce. As the flight of capital from urban 
centers illustrates, employers may relocate because there is too much 
cheap labor available (while their businesses depend on skilled or 
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highly skilled labor), just as easily as they may do so because there is 
too little. 
In short, Germany cannot solve high-road problems with low-road 
practices; in the United States, labor and management are confronting 
the problems of trying to take the high road in a low-road context. 
Solutions for the two countries are necessarily different, but they can 
be unified in a common conceptual framework. Actors must differenti-
ate between the constraining and supportive aspects of coordinating 
institutional frameworks. Centralized forums for setting standards, 
sharing information, and pooling resources are important components 
of a successful high-road strategy. However, rigid, functionally spe-
cialized and hierarchically organized approaches to innovation and 
change entail unnecessary institutional constraints. The Germans have 
a surfeit of both coordinating institutions and organizational rigidities; 
they need to maximize the former and minimize the latter. Political 
economic actors in the United States must for the most part build high-
road institutions and practices from scratch (using Germany and other 
countries as guides) while avoiding hierarchical rigidities and con-
straints. Can this be done? Not without a great deal of U.S.-style inno-
vation and experimentation. Such innovation is currently revitalizing 
the U.S. labor movement; there is no reason why it cannot also be 
channeled into high-road institution building. 
Notes 
1. The German "negotiated" and the U.S. "unilateral" approach to competitiveness 
are defined in Wever (1995b). They refer to the institutional structures that engen-
der negotiations about organizational change between labor and management in 
Germany and that discourage such negotiation, creating incentives for a more uni-
lateral managerial approach, in the United States. 
2. In October 1997, IG Chemie merged with the miners and leatherworkers unions, 
forming IG Chemie-Bergbau-Energie. 
3. Two examples will illustrate this problem. The Service Employees International 
Union's Justice for Janitors campaign organizes workers in an entire labor market 
rather than in the legally prescribed company-by-company fashion. The interna-
tionally acclaimed Saturn experiment, designed by General Motors and the 
United Autoworkers union to include full-fledged union participation in all areas 
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of management, is inconsistent with the law's stipulation that union members can-
not perform managerial work and with its provisions for choosing union represen-
tatives. 
4. For example, disputes between the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and 
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers date back sev-
eral decades. 
5. It is important in this connection to note that some research suggests that the 
union wage premium is more than compensated for by increases in unionized 
employers' productivity, which can be attributed to the fact that unions can spur 
employers to seek more effective ways of organizing work and production and to 
the fact that productivity and quality-enhancing participatory programs involving 
unions, workers, and managers may be more successful and long lasting in union-
ized settings than in nonunion companies (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Applebaum 
and Batt 1994; Kelley and Harrison 1992). 
6. The most famous of these cases is that of Eastern Airlines in the mid 1980s. A 
more recent and still unfolding case is that of BellSouth, whose Excellence 
Through Quality programs, designed together with the Communication Workers 
of America, became in the late 1990s a lower priority for a management team 
struggling to come to terms with increasingly heavy competition resulting from 
the final phases of telecommunications deregulation. In this connection, the tele-
communications industry is an interesting German-United States comparative 
case study, because in Germany the union has been far more successful in defend-
ing the rights of workers in the wake of deregulation (Batt and Darbishire, in this 
volume, p. 17). 
7. The case of IBM leaving Gesamtmetall was more the result of the employment 
profile and market dynamics in the computer industry. 
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